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1II.  STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.  Nature of the Case
Terry Ash is appealing from the summary dismissal of his petition for post-conviction
relief.  R 209-212.  Relief should be granted because Mr. Ash raised a genuine issue of material
fact as to whether he was deprived of effective assistance of counsel when his attorney failed to
move to dismiss on the basis of double jeopardy after the state caused a mistrial in his first trial
by eliciting a comment on Mr. Ash’s exercise of his right to remain silent.  Mr. Ash also raised a
genuine issue of material fact as to whether prosecutorial misconduct in bringing the second
prosecution after the state had caused the mistrial in the first trial violated Mr. Ash’s state and
federal constitutional protections against double jeopardy. 
B.  Procedural History and Statement of Facts
On March 12, 2012, the state tried Mr. Ash for DUI. I.C. § 18-8004.  R 5, 95.  In her case
in chief, the prosecutor asked the arresting officer: “Now, after he performed those FSTs and you
arrested him, did he say anything about drinking any more alcohol besides the one beer?”  The
officer responded: “He decided not to say anything more after that.”  R 95 (Tr. 3/12/12, p. 1, ln.
10-13). 
Defense counsel immediately moved for a mistrial.  R 96-97 (Tr. 3/12/12, p. 2, ln. 1-p. 3,
ln. 1.)  After an opportunity for briefing and arguments, the district court declared a mistrial.  R
110-111 (Tr. 3/13/12, p. 16, ln. 23-p. 17, ln. 2).  
In its arguments, the state requested that the court find that the prosecutor did not commit
misconduct.  R 105 (Tr. 3/13/12, p. 13, ln. 3-9).  The court declined this invitation.  The court
found that the question elicited information about statements made post-arrest.  However, the
 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602 (1966). 1
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state had not established a foundation that Miranda  rights were given and waived.  Nor had the1
state laid a foundation to show that post-arrest statements were volunteered.  The court further
noted that in her affidavit supplied in support of objection to mistrial, the prosecutor stated that
her strategy was to use evidence of post-arrest silence to box Mr. Ash into a more difficult
decision on whether to testify.  The court noted two fundamental problems: first, the state is not
permitted to begin its case in chief by impeaching testimony which has not been given no matter
how well founded the belief that the testimony will eventually be given; second, the state cannot
impeach a defendant’s testimony with evidence of post-arrest silence.  R 107-110 (Tr. 3/13/12, p.
13, ln. 10-p. 16, ln. 15).
The state apparently understood the significance of a finding of prosecutorial misconduct
as it sent a second prosecutor to argue and specifically request a finding of no prosecutorial 
misconduct.  R 105-107 (Tr. 3/13/12, p. 11, ln. 13-p. 13, ln. 10).  However, Mr. Ash’s attorney
apparently did not understand the significance.  He did not move to dismiss on the basis of
double jeopardy.  State’s Ex. 1-3 (transcript of second trial). 
At the second trial, the jury convicted Mr. Ash of DUI.  State’s Ex. 1 (Ex. Disc p. 70 (Tr.
6/12/12, p. 247, ln. 16-21)).   Mr. Ash also admitted a prior DUI within 15 years and persistent
violator status.  State’s Ex. 1 (Ex. Disc p. 72 (Tr. 6/12/12 p. 255, ln. 12-24); p. 74 (Tr. 6/12/12 p.
263, ln. 14-20)).    
The court sentenced Mr. Ash to life with a minimum fixed term of 15 years, a sentence
that imprisons him at minimum until he is 70 years old.  State’s Ex. 1 (Ex. Disc p. 81 (Tr.
10/17/12 p. 294, ln. 22-p. 295, ln. 3)). 
3Mr. Ash filed a Rule 35 motion for reduction of sentence which the court denied. State’s
Ex. 4 (Ex. Disc p. 104-111).
Mr. Ash appealed.  The Court of Appeals denied relief.  R 7.  He then filed a petition for
review which was also denied and the remittitur issued.  Id.  Thereafter, Mr. Ash filed a timely
pro se petition for post-conviction relief.  R 5-21.
The district court appointed counsel and counsel filed an amended petition.  R 151-154. 
The amended petition did not abandon any of the claims in the pro se petition but did add two
additional claims.  Id.  Specifically, counsel raised a claim of ineffective assistance of trial
counsel in failing to object to the second prosecution under state and federal constitutional
protections against double jeopardy.  R 151-152.  Counsel also raised a claim that the second
prosecution violated Mr. Ash’s state and federal constitutional rights against double jeopardy.  R
152-153. 
The state filed a motion for summary dismissal.  R 135-136.  Mr. Ash objected and
moved for summary judgment in his favor.  R 155-163.  The court summarily dismissed the
petition.  R 189-207.
The court entered a final judgment and this appeal timely follows.  R 208-212.
III.  ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
1.  Did Mr. Ash raise a genuine issue of material fact as to whether trial counsel was
ineffective in failing to move to dismiss the second prosecution as a violation of his state and
federal constitutional protections against double jeopardy?  U.S. Const. Amends. 5, 6, and 14;
Idaho Const. Art. I, § 13.
42.  Did Mr. Ash raise a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the second
prosecution denied  his constitutional protections against double jeopardy?  U.S. Const. Amends.
5 and 14; Idaho Const. Art. I, § 13. 
IV.  ARGUMENT
A.  Mr. Ash Raised a Genuine Issue of Material Fact as to Whether Counsel Was
Ineffective in Failing to Move to Dismiss the Second Prosecution as a Violation of
His Constitutional Protections Against Double Jeopardy
The district court erred in summarily dismissing Mr. Ash’s ineffective assistance of
counsel claim because he did raise a genuine issue of material fact as to whether counsel was
ineffective in not moving to dismiss on double jeopardy grounds.  The district court declined the
state’s invitation to find no misconduct on the prosecutor’s part in its ruling granting a mistrial. 
Moreover, the prosecutor’s affidavit in support of the state’s opposition to a mistrial is internally
inconsistent averring that she both knows Fifth Amendment law and that she did not intend to
elicit testimony that would violate Mr. Ash’s Fifth Amendment right to remain silent - yet she
clearly did elicit such testimony.  Given the lack of a ruling by the district court finding no
misconduct, Mr. Ash has raised a genuine issue of material fact as to whether his counsel was
ineffective. 
1.  Standard of Review
Idaho Code § 19-4906 authorizes summary dismissal of an application for post-
conviction relief, either pursuant to motion of a party or upon the trial court’s own
initiative.  Summary dismissal of an application is the procedural equivalent of
summary judgment under IRCP 56.  When reviewing the grant of a motion for
summary judgment, this Court applies the same standard used by the district court
in ruling on the motion.  Likewise, when reviewing a district’s order of summary
dismissal in a post-conviction relief proceeding, we apply the same standard as
that applied by the district court.  Thus, when reviewing such a dismissal, this
Court must determine whether a genuine issue of fact exists based on the
5pleadings, depositions and admissions together with any affidavits on file. 
Ridgley v. State, 148 Idaho 671, 675, 227 P.3d 925, 929 (2010) (internal quotations and citations
omitted). 
“[I]f the petitioner’s alleged facts are uncontroverted by the State . . . [they] must be
regarded as true.”  Phillips v. State, 108 Idaho 405, 407, 700 P.2d 27, 29 (1985), as quoted in
Ridgley v. State, supra.
Moreover, “if the petition, affidavits and other evidence supporting the petition allege
facts that, if true, would entitle the petitioner to relief, the post-conviction claim may not be
summarily dismissed.”  Stevens v. State, 156 Idaho 396, 405, 327 P.3d 372, 381 (Ct. App. 2013). 
A claim of ineffective assistance of counsel is analyzed under Strickland v. Washington,
466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052 (1984).  To prevail a petitioner must prove: 1) counsel’s
performance was deficient in that it fell below standards of reasonable professional performance;
and 2) this deficient performance was prejudicial.  Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. at 689,
104 S.Ct. at 2065.  Prejudice is shown if there is a reasonable probability that a different result
would have been obtained had the attorney acted properly.  Id.  
2.  Argument
In his amended petition, Mr. Ash stated that the prosecutor deliberately elicited
information which commented on his right to remain silent while in custody.  Further, the
prosecutor admitted in her affidavit to the court that she wanted the jury to know that he had
declined to answer post-arrest questions as part of an intentional strategy to control Mr. Ash’s
anticipated testimony.  The prosecutor’s action resulted in a mistrial.  R 152. 
Mr. Ash further stated that counsel’s failure to object to a second trial was below an
  This quotation reproduces the grammatical errors in the original. 2
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objectively reasonable standard of competence and that he was prejudiced because such an
objection should have been sustained on double jeopardy grounds.  Id. 
In her affidavit submitted in support of opposition to Mr. Ash’s motion for mistrial, the
trial prosecutor averred: 
. . . 
15.  Your affiant understands how the Fifth Amendment applies to suspect and
defendants rights and would not intentionally attempt to violate that right.  
16.  Your affiant did not intentionally attempt to elicit testimony that would
violate the Defendant’s Fifth Amendment right to silence.
. . . 
19.  Your affiant did not know the Defendant invoked his right to remain silent
and believed the testimony would be admissible.  Your affiant notes that the
Defendant continued to make unprompted statements on the way to the Ada
County Jail reflected the Defendant’s awareness that he was impaired and would
likely be convicted. 
R 120-121.2
The state specifically requested that the district court not find that the prosecutor had
committed misconduct in eliciting the comment on Mr. Ash’s post-arrest silence.  R 106-107 (Tr.
3/13/12 p. 12, ln. 13-p. 13, ln. 9).   However, the court declined to make such a ruling.  R 107-
110 (Tr. 3/13/12 p. 13, ln. 11-p. 17, ln. 3).  
In the post-conviction case, when arguing for summary dismissal, the prosecutor (a
different prosecutor from the trial prosecutor) made this comment: 
But clearly [the trial prosecutor’s] affidavit, which is the current state of the
record, says she didn’t know [that it was impermissible to elicit comments on the
defendant’s post-arrest silence].  As a personal issue, do I – am I okay with that? 
7No.  But, clearly, we have to – the Court has to make rulings based upon the state
of the record and the state of the law in Idaho.
Tr. 4/25/16, p. 16, ln. 9-14. 
The district court dismissed Mr. Ash’s claim of ineffective assistance in not moving to
dismiss the second trial.  The court found that the prosecutor did act intentionally in asking about
Mr. Ash’s post-arrest silence.  However, the court further concluded that there was nothing in the
record to show that the state intended thereby to provoke Mr. Ash into moving for a mistrial;
rather she simply did not understand the law on comments on silence.  Therefore, the court
concluded, a double jeopardy objection would not have been well founded and there was not
ineffective assistance.  R 201-202. 
Generally, when a defendant moves for a mistrial, double jeopardy does not bar a retrial. 
Oregon v. Kennedy, 456 U.S. 667, 673, 102 S.Ct. 2083, 2088 (1982).  However, Kennedy
established a narrow exception for cases wherein the prosecutor intended to provoke the motion
for mistrial.  Id., 456 U.S. at 679, 102 S.Ct. at 2091.  
In this case, the court did not determine in the first trial whether the prosecutor intended
to provoke a mistrial.  And, while the prosecutor filed an affidavit denying her intention to
violate Mr. Ash’s Fifth Amendment rights, her affidavit nonetheless attested to an intentional
strategy to violate Mr. Ash’s rights.  As evidenced by the affidavit, she intended to question Mr.
Ash about his post-arrest silence.  The prosecutor claimed she did not realize that he had invoked
his right to remain silent despite reviewing a video containing the invocation. R 120.  But, the
prosecutor made no claim that she did not realize that Mr. Ash was arrested at the time he
declined to speak.  In fact, her question was “after . . . you arrested him did he say anything . . .” 
8R  R 95 (Tr. 3/12/12, p. 1, ln. 10-13).  And, she further made no claim that she did not
understand that per State v. Ellington, 151 Idaho 53, 59-60, 253 P.3d 727, 733-734 (2011), the
right to remain silent attaches upon custody and thus a prosecutor may not use any post-custody
silence to infer guilt in its case-in-chief.  (The prosecutor had to be aware of Ellington at the time
she created her affidavit because her affidavit was drafted after the court had discussed Ellington
in detail with defense counsel and the prosecutor.  R 100-104 (Tr. 3/12/12 p. 6, ln. 8-p. 10, ln.
3).)  In fact, the prosecutor specifically averred that she understood Fifth Amendment law. 
Further, as noted by the district court, there is no question but that the prosecutor could not use
Mr. Ash’s silence to infer guilt in its case in chief.  R 107-110 (Tr. 3/13/12, p. 13, ln. 10-p. 16, ln.
15); State v. Ellington, supra.
Thus, the prosecutor’s affidavit was internally inconsistent.  Either she was in error when
she claimed that she knew Fifth Amendment law or she was in error when she claimed that she
did not intend to violate Mr. Ash’s Fifth Amendment rights and did not intentionally elicit
testimony to do so.  
In either case, there remains, even after the affidavit, a genuine issue of material fact as to
whether the prosecutor intended to provoke a mistrial thus raising a double jeopardy bar to the
second trial.  
The court erred in not allowing an evidentiary hearing wherein Mr. Ash could present
testimony and evidence to establish prosecutorial misconduct which would have precluded a
second trial per Kennedy, supra.  He could have further established that counsel was therefore
ineffective in failing to object to the second trial.  Stevens v. State, supra.  
9B.  Mr. Ash Raised a Genuine Issue of Material Fact as to Whether the
Prosecutor’s Misconduct in the Initial Trial Precluded the Retrial Under the State
and Federal Protections Against Double Jeopardy
In addition to a remand for an evidentiary hearing on the ineffective assistance of counsel
claim, this Court should also remand for an evidentiary hearing on the direct double jeopardy
claim.  The second trial violated Mr. Ash’s state and federal constitutional protections against
double jeopardy.  The district court should have held a hearing on this claim. 
1.  Standard of Review
This Court reviews constitutional claims de novo. State v. Lankford, ___ Idaho ___, ___
P.3d ___, 2016 WL 4010851 *2 (2016); State v. Dunlap, 155 Idaho 345, 361, 313 P.3d 1, 17
(2013).  
2.  Argument
In the seventh claim in his amended petition, Mr. Ash raised a direct constitutional claim
of violation of the state and federal constitutional protections against double jeopardy.  R 152-
153.  In his amended petition, Mr. Ash pointed out the prosecutorial misconduct which
prohibited a retrial and then set out his claim: 
Petitioner’s rights to be free from double jeopardy are guaranteed under
Amendment V of the United States Constitution and Article I §13 of the Idaho
Constitution.  Petitioner’s rights were violated by the second prosecution and
conviction under these circumstances.  Therefore, Petitioner’s conviction is illegal
and should be set aside by the court.
R 153. 
The district court mistakenly addressed this as a claim of prosecutorial misconduct as
opposed to a violation of the state and federal constitutional protections against double jeopardy. 
R 203.  However, in determining the prosecutorial misconduct question, the district court
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concluded that “double jeopardy had not attached” so as to prevent the second trial.  Id.  The
court further concluded that Mr. Ash could not raise a prosecutorial misconduct claim because
the issue was not raised in direct appeal.  Id. 
If prosecutorial misconduct does not rise to the level of a constitutional violation, but is
mere trial error, then it may be that failure to raise the issue in direct appeal is a waiver.  See Bias
v. State, 159 Idaho 696, 702-703, 365 P.3d 1050, 1056-1057 (Ct. App. 2015), stating with regard
to a claim of prosecutorial misconduct raised for the first time in post-conviction, “Mintun [v.
State, 144 Idaho 656, 168 P.3d 40 (Ct. App. 2007),] did not hold, even tangentially, that an
unpreserved trial error itself can be raised in a post-conviction proceeding.”  
However, constitutional errors clearly can be raised for the first time in post-conviction. 
Idaho Code § 19-4901(a)(1) states that post-conviction is available to “[a]ny person who has
been convicted of, or sentenced for a crime and who claims: (1) That the conviction or the
sentence was in violation of the constitution of the United States or the constitution or laws of
this state[.]”  
Examples of constitutional issues raised and determined for the first time in post-
conviction include: 
• Violation of plea agreement:  Berg v. State, 131 Idaho 517, 519, 960 P.2d 738,
740 (1998) (“Berg asserted that the prosecutor breached the parties’ plea
agreement by recommending that he be sentenced to prison rather than
recommending a retained jurisdiction.”); Short v. State, 135 Idaho 40, 41, 13 P.3d
1253, 1254 (Ct. App. 2000).
• Violation of the right to testify:  Rossignol v. State, 152 Idaho 700, 706, 274
P.3d 1, 7 (Ct. App. 2012), review denied (2012) (“[T]he issue of the failure of a
defendant to testify may be viewed in post-conviction proceedings either as a
claim of ineffective assistance of counsel or as a claim of a deprivation of a
constitutional right.”); Cootz v. State, 129 Idaho 360, 924 P.2d 622 (Ct. App.
11
1996); DeRushé v. State, 146 Idaho 599, 603-04, 200 P.3d 1148, 1152-53 (2009)
(“The district court erred in analyzing DeRushé’s claim as alleging ineffective
assistance of counsel rather than as alleging denial of his constitutional right to
testify on his own behalf[.]”); Barcella v. State, 148 Idaho 469, 224 P.3d 536 (Ct.
App. 2009).
• Due process right to participate in defense:  Murillo v. State, 144 Idaho 449,
452, 163 P.3d 238, 241 (Ct. App. 2007) (“Murillo argues that he was rendered
unable to participate in his defense because he had an insufficient opportunity to
confer with his trial counsel with the aid of an interpreter and was not provided
with copies or oral translations of documents related to his case.”)
• Adequacy of plea colloquy:  Noel v. State, 113 Idaho 92, 94, 741 P.2d 728, 730
(Ct. App. 1987) (“Noel’s petition alleged, among other things, that he was not
adequately advised by his legal counsel, or by the court, of the ‘requisite specific
intent to commit murder, nor of the possible consequences of a guilty plea.’”).
• Suggestiveness of line-up and other issues:  Cooper v. State, 96 Idaho 542,
545, 531 P.2d 1187, 1190 (1975) (“He maintains the district court should have
investigated through the medium of an evidentiary hearing his application wherein
he raised questions as to: (1) the unfair suggestiveness of the lineup; (2) the lack
of counsel at the lineup; (3) pleas induced by false statements of counsel; and (4)
appellant's mental capacity during the criminal proceedings.”)
Idaho Code § 19-4901(b) does not preclude a petitioner from raising a constitutional
claim for the first time in post-conviction.  While the subsection refers to issues which could
have been raised on direct appeal but were not as forfeited, that waiver can not apply to
constitutional claims, jurisdictional claims, or claims that the sentence exceeds the maximum
authorized by law.  All of those claims are specifically authorized by I.C. § 19-4901(a) and all
also can be raised in direct appeal.  Section 19-4901(b) must be construed so as to not preclude
the claims authorized by section 19-4901(a) and thus be limited to mere trial errors because
“[i]nterpretations which would render the statute a nullity, or which would lead to absurd results,
are disfavored.”  I.C. § 73-113(2).  See also, Bonner County v. Cunningham, 156 Idaho 291, 295,
323 P.3d 1252 (Ct. App. 2014) (noting the fundamental principle of statutory construction
12
requiring an interpretation that gives effect to all the words of the statute and does not render any
part of the statute a nullity). 
Mr. Ash’s state and federal constitutional claims of double jeopardy violation were
properly raised in post-conviction and were not waived.  
For the reasons discussed above, the retrial was a violation of constitutional double
jeopardy protections because the Kennedy exception applies as the prosecutor acted intentionally
in eliciting testimony in the first trial which commented on Mr. Ash’s exercise of his right to
remain silent. The district court should have allowed an evidentiary hearing for Mr. Ash to
present evidence in support of this conclusion.  
In addition, the court should have allowed an evidentiary hearing wherein Mr. Ash could
present testimony to establish that even if the prosecutor did not intend to provoke a mistrial, she
acted with the requisite intent to preclude a retrial under the expansion of the Kennedy exception
set out in United States v. Wallach, 979 F.2d 912 (2  Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 508 U.S. 939, 113nd
S.Ct. 2414 (1993), or under an even broader exception consistent with the Idaho Constitution’s
greater protection against double jeopardy.  
The Wallach court wrote: 
Since Kennedy bars a retrial on jeopardy grounds where the prosecutor engages in
misconduct for the purpose of goading the defendant into making a successful
mistrial motion that denied the defendant the opportunity to win an acquittal, the
Supreme Court might think that the Double Jeopardy Clause protects a defendant
from retrial in some other circumstances where prosecutorial misconduct is
undertaken with the intention of denying the defendant an opportunity to win an
acquittal. 
979 F.2d at 916. 
The court reasoned that the extension of Kennedy should apply where “the misconduct of
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the prosecutor is undertaken, not simply to prevent an acquittal, but to prevent an acquittal that
the prosecutor believed at the time was likely to occur in the absence of his misconduct.”  Id. 
Following Wallach, other courts have either extended Kennedy or have left open the
question of whether, in the proper case, the Wallach extension should be adopted.  State v.
Minnitt, 55 P.3d 774, 781 (Az. 2002) (intentional and pervasive misconduct which structurally
impairs the trial results in double jeopardy bar to retrial); State v. Colton, 663 A.2d 339, 346
(Conn. 1995) (adopts Wallach exception for misconduct undertaken with the intent to prevent an
acquittal that the prosecutor believed likely to occur without the misconduct); Jacob v. Clarke,
52 F.3d 178, 181 (8  Cir. 1995) (noting that several circuits have struggled with the question ofth
whether to extend Kennedy and commenting that Lockhart v. Nelson, 488 U.S. 33, 109 S.Ct. 285
(1988), suggests that the extent of the exception remains an open question); United States v.
Doyle, 121 F.3d 1078, 1085 (7  Cir. 1997) (leaving open the question of whether the circuitth
would adopt a Wallach extension of Kennedy under the right circumstances); United States v.
Pavloyianis, 996 F.2d 1467, 1473-1474 (2  Cir. 1993) (noting that the extent of the Kennedynd
exception remains an open question); United States v. Catton, 130 F.3d 805, 807 (7  Cir. 1997)th
(noting the extent of the Kennedy exception remains an open question).
Likewise, several courts have expanded the Kennedy exception under their state
constitutional protections against double jeopardy.  The first of these was Oregon in the remand
of Kennedy.  State v. Kennedy, 666 P.2d 1316, 1326 (Or. 1983) (retrial barred when improper
official conduct is so prejudicial to the defendant that it cannot be cured short of a mistrial and
official knew that the conduct was improper and prejudicial and either intended or was
indifferent to the resulting mistrial or reversal).  See also, Pool v. Superior Court in and For
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Pima County, 677 P.2d 261, 271-272 (Az. 1984) (expanding double jeopardy protection under
state constitution); State v. Fuller, 374 N.W.2d 722, 727 (Minn. 1985) (leaving open question of
whether state constitution provides greater double jeopardy protection than set out in Kennedy);
People v. Dawson, 427 N.W.2d 886 (Mich. 1988) (leaving open the question of whether the state
constitution provides greater protection than the federal); Commonwealth v. Smith, 615 A.2d 321,
325 (Pa. 1992) (state constitution prohibits retrial when prosecutor intentionally acts to prejudice
defendant and deny a fair trial); State v. Colton, 663 A.2d 339, 346 (Conn. 1995) (Kennedy
should be extended to bar a new trial, even in the absence of mistrial or reversal because of
prosecutorial misconduct, if the prosecutor in the first trial engaged in misconduct with the intent
to prevent an acquittal that the prosecutor believed at the time was likely to occur in the absence
of the misconduct); State v. Breit, 930 P.2d 792 (N.M. 1996) (adopting a “willful disregard”
standard under state constitution); Ex parte Mitchell, 977 S.W.2d 575, 580 (Tex.Crim.App.
1997) (under state constitution retrial is jeopardy-barred not only when state deliberately
provoked the defense motion for mistrial but also where the motion for mistrial was due to
reckless behavior on the part of the state); State v. D’Auira, 492 S.E.2d 918, 920 (Ga.App. 1997)
(when defendant’s conviction is reversed on appeal, prosecutorial misconduct bars retrial when
the prosecutor intended “to prevent an acquittal that the prosecutor believed at the time was
likely to occur in the absence of his misconduct”); State v. Lettice, 585 N.W.2d 171, 181
(Wis.App. 1998) (even in the absence of a motion for mistrial, the double jeopardy clause bars
retrial when the prosecutorial misconduct is undertaken to prevent an acquittal that the
prosecutor believed at the time was likely to occur in the absence of the misconduct); State v.
Rogan, 984 P.2d 1231, 1249 (Hawai’i 1999) (under state constitution reprosecution is barred
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when, in the face of egregious prosecutorial misconduct, it cannot be said beyond a reasonable
doubt that the defendant received a fair trial); State v. Martinez, 86 P.3d 1210 (Wash.App. 2004)
(retrial barred under court rule even when it might not have been barred under the Kennedy
exception in a case involving prosecutor’s withholding of exculpatory evidence).   
Idaho’s Constitution provides: “No person shall be twice put in jeopardy for the same
offense[.]” Const. Art. I, § 13.  In the past Idaho’s Supreme Court and Court of Appeals have
held that the state constitutional protection is co-extensive with the federal constitutional
protection.  State v. McKeeth, 136 Idaho 619, 624, 38 P.3d 1275, 1280 (Ct. App. 2001), citing
Berglund v. Potlatch Corp., 129 Idaho 752, 757, 932 P.2d 875, 880 (1996); State v. Reichenberg,
128 Idaho 452, 457-58, 915 P.2d 14, 19-20 (1996); State v. Sharp, 104 Idaho 691, 693, 662 P.2d
1135, 1137 (1983); and State v. Randles, 115 Idaho 611, 615, 768 P.2d 1344, 1348 (Ct. App.
1989).  However, the Idaho courts have also analyzed double jeopardy cases to find greater
protection under the state constitution than under the federal constitution.  State v. Corbus, 151
Idaho 368, 372, 256 P.3d 776, 781 (Ct. App. 2011), citing State v. Thompson, 101 Idaho 430,
434-35, 614 P.2d 970, 974-75 (1980); Sivak v. State, 112 Idaho 197, 211-12, 731 P.2d 192, 206-
07 (1986); State v. Pizzuto, 119 Idaho 742, 810 P.2d 680 (1991), overruled on other grounds by
State v. Card, 121 Idaho 425, 825 P.2d 1081 (1991); and State v. Stewart, 149 Idaho 383, 234
P.3d 707 (2010).  As Corbin concludes: “Our review of the Idaho Supreme Court cases . . .
demonstrates that the available authority does not provide a clear answer to the question of which
analytical theory should be applied in double jeopardy cases which allege a violation of the
Double Jeopardy Clause of the Idaho Constitution.”  Corbus, 151 Idaho at 375, 256 P.3d at 783. 
In State v. Guzman, 122 Idaho 981, 988, 842 P.2d 660, 667 (1992), the Supreme Court
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noted that independent state analysis of constitutional protections does not mean that the state
court will necessarily reach a different result from the United State Supreme Court; “it only
means that we are free to do so, if it is determined that a different rule better effectuates our
counterpart Idaho constitutional provision.”  
With regard to the state constitutional protection against double jeopardy, Idaho has
sometimes adopted the same analysis and reached the same results as would have been applicable
under the federal constitution, but, importantly, as noted above, Idaho has also extended the
protection in cases where to do so better effectuates our state constitutional provision. 
In this case, this Court could determine that it must decide whether the exception of
Kennedy should be extended.  In that event, it should find that our state constitutional protection
against double jeopardy demands an extension of the Kennedy exception to include the type of
misconduct that occurred in Mr. Ash’s case - intentional violation of the defendant’s
constitutional right to remain silent regardless of whether the intent was to goad the defense into
moving for a mistrial or the intent was to comment upon the defendant’s exercise of his right so
as to prejudice the defense and obtain an acquittal.  
Oregon’s constitution like Idaho’s states that “No person shall be put in jeopardy twice
for the same offence (sic).”  Or. Const. Art. I, § 12.  On remand in Kennedy, the Oregon Supreme
Court adopted this standard: retrial is prohibited when improper official conduct is so prejudicial
to the defendant that it cannot be cured by means short of a mistrial, and if the official knows that
the conduct is improper and prejudicial and either intends or is indifferent to the resulting
mistrial or reversal.  State v. Kennedy, 666 P.2d at 1326.  In adopting this test, the Oregon
Supreme Court emphasized that the state constitutional provision was intended as a protection
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against the harassment, embarrassment and risk of successive prosecutions, not as a sanction for
judicial or prosecutorial error.  The protective nature of the constitutional provision is best served
by a rule that extends beyond intentional provocation to cover other possible abuses.  Id., at
1325. 
 Arizona’s state constitution, like Idaho’s and Oregon’s, provides that no person shall “be
twice put in jeopardy for the same offense.”  A.R.S. Const. Art. 2, § 10.  And, like Oregon,
Arizona interprets the clause to protect against multiple trials, rather than as a means to sanction
the government.  Pool v. Superior Court in and For Pima County, 677 P.2d at 271.  So, like
Oregon, Arizona adopted a broader exception than set out under the federal constitution in
Kennedy.  
First, the Arizona Supreme Court noted that in the case before it, a claim of ignorance as
to the impropriety of his actions by the prosecutor would not salvage the case.  “The law cannot
reward ignorance; there must be a point at which lawyers are conclusively presumed to know
what is proper and what is not.”  Pool, 677 P.2d at 270.  The Court then adopted a three part test
which bars retrial when the misconduct is pursued for any improper purpose with indifference to
a significant resulting danger of mistrial or reversal.  Id., 667 P.2d at 271. 
In State v. Breit, supra, the New Mexico Supreme Court concluded, “[W]e are compelled
to join other states in concluding that the narrow Kennedy rule based solely on prosecutorial
intent does not adequately protect double-jeopardy interests.”  930 P.2d at 795.   In reaching this
conclusion, the Court looked to the words of Justice Black: 
The underlying idea, one that is deeply ingrained in at least the Anglo-American
system of jurisprudence, is that the State with all its resources and power should
not be allowed to make repeated attempts to convict an individual for an alleged
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offense, thereby subjecting him to embarrassment, expense and ordeal and
compelling him to live in a continuing state of anxiety and insecurity, as well as
enhancing the possibility that even though innocent he may be found guilty. 
Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184, 187-88, 78 S.Ct. 221, 223 (1957) as quoted in Breit, 930
P.2d at 796.  The Court then concluded: “Defendants should be protected from reprosecution
once a prosecutor’s actions, regardless of motive or intent, rise to such an extreme that a new trial
is the only recourse.”  Id., 930 P.2d at 800.   The Court further agreed with the Arizona Supreme
Court that prosecutor ignorance could not always lift the bar of double jeopardy.  “Rare are
instances of misconduct that are not violations of rules that every legal professional, no matter
how inexperienced, is charged with knowing.”  Id., 930 P.2d at 803.   Thus, New Mexico has
adopted a “willful disregard” standard as opposed to the Kennedy “intent to goad the defendant
into moving for a mistrial” standard.  Id. 
Pennsylvania also provides greater double jeopardy protection under its state constitution
than the Kennedy standard.  Commonwealth v. Smith, supra, a death penalty case, holds that the
state constitution bars a retrial when the conduct of the prosecutor is undertaken to prejudice the
defendant to the point of the denial of a fair trial.  615 A.2d 321, 325.  
Hawaii offers greater protection under its state constitution, prohibiting retrial after a
mistrial or reversal on appeal when prosecutorial misconduct is so egregious that, from an
objective standpoint, it clearly denied the defendant his or her right to a fair trial.  State v. Rogan,
supra.  In Rogan, a retrial was prohibited after the conviction in the first trial was reversed
because of prosecutorial misconduct in appealing to racial prejudice in closing argument. 
(Rogan’s conviction was reversed after his motion for a mistrial was denied.)  Id.
Idaho takes the state and federal constitutional rights to remain silent very seriously.  See,
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State v. Ellington, 151 Idaho at 60, 253 P.3d at 734, noting that despite a split in federal
authority, Idaho holds that a defendant’s right to remain silent attaches upon custody, not arrest
or interrogation, and thus a prosecutor may not use any post-custody silence to infer guilt in its
case-in-chief.  Likewise, Idaho takes the protection against double jeopardy seriously and has
previously found greater protections under the state constitution than afforded by the federal
constitution.   See, State v. Corbus, supra.
In this tradition, Idaho should adopt a broader exception than the Kennedy exception.  To
best protect her citizens from the ills of double jeopardy, Idaho should adopt a standard akin to
those of her sister states which bar retrial on the basis of double jeopardy when prosecutorial
misconduct has so prejudiced the rights of the defendant that the only recourse is a mistrial or
reversal.  Moreover, Idaho should refrain from lifting the bar of double jeopardy when the
prosecutorial misconduct is a result of a violation of the most basic rules which every prosecutor,
no matter how inexperienced, should be required to know prior to appearing in a criminal case.  
Thus, in this case, the summary dismissal of Mr. Ash’s claim of ineffective assistance of
counsel should be reversed and the matter remanded for an evidentiary hearing.  He should be
allowed to present proof that the mistrial precluded a retrial under the Kennedy standard and that
his counsel was ineffective in failing to move for dismissal.  In addition, he should be allowed to
present proof that a retrial was precluded under a broader exception than set out in Kennedy and
that the state of the law was such that his attorney was objectively deficient in failing to move for
a mistrial under the broader exception.  
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V.  CONCLUSION
Mr. Ash raised two genuine issues of material fact: 1) whether counsel was ineffective in
failing to move to dismiss the second prosecution on the basis of double jeopardy; and 2)
whether the second trial violated his state and federal constitutional protections against double
jeopardy.   The district court erred in summarily dismissing these claims.  He now asks this Court
to reverse the summary dismissal and remand with instructions to grant an evidentiary hearing. 
Respectfully submitted this 7  day of October, 2016.th
/s/Deborah Whipple                                 
Deborah Whipple 
Attorney for Terry Ash
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